“Any
customer can have a car painted any color that he wants so long as it is
black" – Henry Ford
The ouster
of Mohamed Morsi as President of Egypt in a coup d’état by the military will
reverberate not only across the political landscape of the ancient land but
that of the entire Muslim world. Morsi, whilst viewed globally as a barely
acceptable face of political Islam, represented but a segment of a wider
movement in the Muslim world calling for the implementation of Shariah law by
the State.
Numerous
polls have shown overwhelming support amongst the global Muslim populace for
making Shariah the official law of the land. The latest of such research is
that of the Washington based Pew Research organisation entitled ‘The
World’s Muslims; Religion, Politics and Society’ which was
released on April 30, 2013. The poll found that in 25 of the countries surveyed
the majority of Muslims supported Shariah being the law of the land. Notable
findings were Iraq (91%), Malaysia (86%), Niger (86%), Pakistan (84%), Morocco
(83%), Bangladesh (82%), Egypt (74%), Jordan (71%) and Nigeria (71%). What is
intriguing about these findings is not just the level of such support but the
amount of diversity amongst the respondents gives pause for thought; whether
one finds themselves in Africa, the Middle East, South or South East Asia, they
would find a consistent political ambition amongst the people.
So why has
Morsi been rejected in Egypt? To the uninitiated a bearded man from a party,
whose name drips with Islamic symbolism born in the nationalistic aftermath
that followed the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate, which for many years
adopted the slogan ‘Islam is the solution’ would be the realisation of anyone
who desires Shariah law.
On a
superficial level the Morsi government failed to address the economic malaise
faced by Egypt leading to mass discontent. Yet there is also a deeper answer
hiding in plain sight; the Muslim Brotherhood had not only forsaken Islamic
politics decades ago but became the champion of democratisation, predicated on
secular thought, across the Muslim world. Its actions subsequent to the demise
of Hosni Mubarak epitomise its wandering political compass, which have
compounded Egypt’s woes.
Early on in
the revolution it was quick to distance itself from championing the mass movement,
which many interpreted as a sign that it was projecting a moderated stance to
the global media lest Western states decided to intervene against it. This was
designed as much for the consumption of world as it was for the military, the
real power behind the Egyptian throne.
Appropriate
noises were made about wanting a civil state rather than an Islamic one which
led the Brotherhood being allowed to contest the elections as the Freedom and
Justice Party. Many supporters ignored this call due to a mixture of viewing it
as political subterfuge and holding the idea that an Islamic state could be
achieved from within a secular democratic setup by gradual implementation of
Islamic principles. Once in power, rather than using this success at the ballot
box as a mandate for political change, the Brotherhood ended up continuing many
of the key policies and ideological direction of the Mubarak era.
Economically
it was unable to address the issue of resource distribution, with the military
and Mubarak era governments controlling up to 40% of the
economy. As these elites moved wealth out of the country, the Egyptian Pound
plummeted leading to a widening trade deficit as Egypt attempted to service its
energy and food imports using a weakened currency. Out of ideas, Morsi turned
to the IMF for interest based loans. All of these policies were born of the
crucible of economic liberalism, with no Islamic economic policies such as the
introduction of a bi-metallic backed currency, the abolition of natural
resource monopolies or the shifting of the tax burden from income and consumption
to capital and produce in sight.
In terms of
foreign policy the army ensured that Egypt continued to support the goals of
its benefactor, America, rather than reflect public sentiment in Egypt. This
lead to the reaffirmation of the Camp David accords, blocking the tunnels to
Gaza and mostly silence on the issue of the Syrian revolution. This ran counter
to the expected dropping of national borders to unify with other Muslim
countries to create a wider Islamic union and the removal of Western supported
dictators in the Arab world by supplying political/military support to other
revolutions in the region.
Despite unending
compromise on practically every major issue to placate Western states abroad
and secularists at home, the Brotherhood was still ejected from power. This
will leave many supporters of not just the Brotherhood directly but the
politics of gradualism and participation in a democratic process with much to
think about. If democracy cannot tolerate the will of the people if it happens
to be Islamic, then is it truly just a mechanism for representing popular opinion
or is it a system unable to function without the values of secular liberalism
being implemented? Is it really the political equivalent of Henry Ford’s choice
of colour?
The
ramifications of the answer to this question would be important not just to the
fate of Egyptian politics but to that of the entire Muslim world. The Muslim
Brotherhood has inspired many movements in the Muslim world which have espoused
political participation in democracy rather than an attempt at radical change
to establish an Islamic State. If the Brotherhood can be tossed aside, despite
decades of work and masses of support on its home turf, how can such a system
hold any hope for meaningful change?
Lessons learned
from Egypt would suggest that any real change requires the backing of the armed
forces rather than a conflict with them or a simple change of face on the
political front. Further, it would seem that regardless of how much political
Islam compromises it would never be perceived as sufficient by secular segments
of society, so why try at all?
The coming
months and years could see the biggest drop in adoption democracy amongst the
proponents of Shariah law across the Muslim world. Ironically, this would have
been precipitated by a coup backed by secularists and implicitly by Western
powers to rid one country of any influence of political Islam.
Published on 8th July 2013 in The Nation (Pakistan) as Morsi’s toppling: a blow for secularism
Muhammad Asim
Twitter: @AsimWriter
